Where does antimony come from?

Two big antimony ore flows meet in Thailand. In 2024 the two largest bilateral flows of ore and concentrate (HS 261710) ran from Myanmar to Thailand, worth $81.4 million or 17% of world ore trade value, and from Thailand to China, worth $101.3 million or 21% (CEPII BACI corridor table). The data cannot show whether these are the same cargo. They do show a price jump. Thailand's declared export value was $3,699 per tonne against $1,928 on its imports, about 1.9 times as much (our arithmetic on the same tables). USGS lists no Thai mine output, and an ore line of any grade says nothing about antimony content.

A 7% fall in world antimony mine output looks large but is mostly one country's estimate. World output was 110,720 tonnes in 2025 against 119,000 tonnes in 2024 (USGS MCS 2026, sum of listed countries). Russia's estimate dropped from 40,000 to 32,000 tonnes, which is 97% of the 8,280-tonne world decline, while China's figure stayed at 40,000 tonnes. USGS's first estimates for 2022 and 2024 were later revised by 24% down (110,000 to 83,100 tonnes) and 19% up (100,000 to 119,000 tonnes), a median revision of 22%, which is part of why the site rates antimony data Rough. A 7% move sits well inside that range.

The United States leans on imports for most of its antimony, and more than it did in 2021. Net import reliance for antimony metal and oxide, the share of apparent consumption met by net imports, was 85% in 2021 and 91% in 2025 (USGS MCS 2026, US only; see US import reliance). Recycled supply covered 7.8% of 2025 consumption (USGS). In 2024 the US declared $9,908 per tonne on its oxide imports, the lowest of the five largest oxide importers; the other four ranged from $13,862 (India) to $15,319 (Japan) (CEPII BACI). The data show the gap but not its source.

In 2025 China mined 40,000 tonnes of antimony content, 36% of the world's 110,720 tonnes (USGS MCS). Russia followed with 29% and Tajikistan with 20%, so the top three mine 85% between them. Bolivia (4.5%) and Myanmar (4.1%) come next, the top five account for 93%, and 15 countries are listed. World output changed -7% on the previous year, and the USGS table shows that the decline came mainly from a lower Russian estimate. USGS also revised its 2024 figures for China, Russia and several smaller producers in the 2026 edition using company, government and third-party reports, and it marks the Chinese, Russian and Tajik figures as estimates, so these numbers are best read as good approximations rather than audited counts. The world total excludes United States output, which USGS withholds to avoid disclosing a single company's data.

The ore is almost always stibnite, antimony sulfide, which forms in veins where hot, mineral-rich water has deposited it at relatively low temperature, often alongside gold, lead or silver. That is why antimony is mined both as the main product and as a by-product or co-product of other metals, and why deposits are scattered through belts of hydrothermal mineralisation from central Asia to Bolivia to eastern Australia rather than being concentrated in a few giant orebodies.

Reserves stand at 2.4 million tonnes in 2025, the sum of the national figures USGS reports, with China holding 35%, Russia 15%, Bolivia 13% and Kyrgyzstan 11% (USGS MCS). Reserves and output do not line up. Tajikistan is the third-largest miner but reports a small reserve, while Bolivia and Kyrgyzstan hold far more than they mine. Some of the reserve figures are also unusually soft: the United States figure is the company-reported probable reserve of a single project in Idaho, and Australia's headline reserve differs sharply from the figure compliant with the JORC reporting code.

The antimony chain is best read through three trade lines rather than one, because each has a different set of leading exporters. In 2024 Thailand was the largest exporter of antimony ore and concentrate (HS 261710) with 29% of world export value, ahead of Myanmar (24%) and Australia (11%), on world trade of $472.7 million (CEPII BACI). China took 55% of ore imports, with Thailand second on 17%. The production table lists no Thai mine output, so Thailand's lead among ore exporters suggests a processing or transit role, and the trade data alone cannot say more than that.

Antimony oxide (HS 282580) is a larger trade, worth $934.9 million in 2024, and the leading exporter is China with 50%, followed by Belgium (15%) and France (13%). Belgium and France do not appear among the mine producers in the USGS table, so their oxide exports are made from imported material. The largest importer of oxide was the United States with 26%, followed by India and Italy.

Unwrought antimony and powders (HS 811010) were worth $791.4 million, and here the exporters are different again: Tajikistan (30%), Vietnam (16%) and Thailand (14%), with China fourth on 11%. The leading importers were France (17%) and Belgium (17%).

The contrast is the main point. The ore trade leads to Asian smelters and oxide plants, the oxide trade is led by a different set of countries, and the metal trade by a third. The trade data are for 2024, the year China's export controls began (described below), so they do not show the full effect of those controls.

This page quotes no antimony price, because there is no free public benchmark. Antimony has no exchange futures contract, and metal and oxide are assessed by private price reporting agencies, with the United States Geological Survey drawing its annual price from Argus Media's assessment of antimony metal of a stated minimum grade on a cost, insurance and freight basis. Publishing a price series would require a licence this site does not hold.

What can be said is how the market works. Antimony trioxide, ingot and concentrate are separate products with separate assessments, and the figures are not interchangeable: oxide and metal have been through processing that concentrate has not, so a price for one says little about the others.

Prices have also behaved differently from the larger metals. USGS reports that the average price in 2025 was more than double the 2024 average, and that monthly average prices climbed through the second half of 2024 after China announced export restrictions in August and then a ban on exports to the United States in December. USGS adds that the price had risen further by June 2025 and was lower again by November, but that describes one assessment, not a benchmark. Companies named on this page are listed for context on who operates in the market, and naming a listed company is not investment advice.

China has required export licences for antimony items since September 2024. Whether licences are granted, how quickly, and to whom are variables set by the Chinese government, and they affect what reaches buyers outside China independently of how much is mined.

Antimony is useful only after it has been turned into trioxide or metal, and that capacity is concentrated in a small number of plants. A country can mine antimony without being able to process it, which is why the oxide and metal export lists differ from the mine production list and why new mines outside China do not by themselves diversify supply.

Antimony trioxide works as a synergist with halogenated flame retardants, boosting their effect in plastics, textiles and cable coatings. Demand follows production of electronics, construction materials and vehicles, which makes it a steady, broad-based use that rises and falls with industrial activity.

Antimony hardens the lead alloy used in battery plates, so a large part of its use is tied to vehicle and backup-power batteries. Because antimonial lead is recovered from spent batteries at lead smelters, this is also the main route by which antimony is recycled.

Antimony is used in ammunition and other military applications, and USGS reports that antimonial lead and ammunition were among the leading end uses in the United States.

Antimony compounds, in particular sodium antimonate, are used to clarify molten glass, including the low-iron glass used in photovoltaic panels. The USGS summary does not quantify this use, so this page gives no figure for it.

USGS records a US mine start in Montana in 2025 and the start of construction at a project in Idaho, and companies in Australia and elsewhere are developing or expanding antimony output. Mines take years to permit and build, and an operating mine is only the first step, because the concentrate still has to be processed.

Stibnite is mined from underground veins or, in some places, open pits. High-grade ore can be hand-sorted or crushed and sent directly to a furnace. Lower-grade ore is crushed, ground and concentrated by froth flotation, and the resulting concentrate is smelted. Where antimony occurs with gold, as at some Australian and North American deposits, it is recovered alongside the gold.

There are two main routes from stibnite to a usable product. In one, the sulfide is roasted to oxide and then reduced with carbon to make metal. In the other, the sulfide is reduced directly with iron. Antimony trioxide, the main chemical product, is produced in furnaces from either the ore or the metal, and the oxide is then sold as a powder or blended into masterbatch for plastics.

The metal is often alloyed with lead rather than used pure, and antimonial lead is the form used in batteries. Secondary antimony is recovered at secondary lead smelters from spent lead-acid batteries, and the resulting alloy goes back into battery manufacturing.

Antimony and its compounds are toxic, and the processing steps involve furnace gases and dusts that need controlling.

The largest group of uses is flame retardants. Antimony trioxide works as a synergist, boosting the effect of halogen-based flame retardants. It is used in plastics, textiles, cables and electronics housings, and USGS puts flame retardants and other metal products as the leading use in the United States.

The second major use is lead alloys, mainly the antimonial lead used for battery plates and for ammunition. Antimony hardens lead and improves how it casts and cycles, which is why it has stayed in lead-acid batteries and in bullets and shot for so long, although USGS notes that combinations of calcium, copper, selenium, sulfur and tin can replace antimony in battery alloys.

A third group is glass, ceramics and pigments. Antimony compounds clarify glass, including the glass used for solar modules, and are used in enamels and paints, where compounds of chromium, tin, titanium, zinc and zirconium are listed by USGS as alternatives. Selected organic compounds and hydrated aluminium oxide can replace antimony as flame retardants, but the substitution has costs and performance trade-offs that vary by product.

Smaller uses include semiconductors and other military applications.

The chain runs from stibnite mine to concentrate, then to smelter or oxide plant, then to fabricators of plastics, batteries, ammunition and glass. Mining is concentrated, with 85% of output from three countries. The processed lines have different leading exporters from the mines, and China's share is larger in oxide exports (50% by value) than in mining (36%); it is not among the five largest ore exporters and ranks only fourth for unwrought metal.

That is the critical-mineral point about antimony. The question for antimony is where each stage of the chain sits: the ore, oxide and metal trades have different leading exporters, so dependence differs at each step. The US 2025 list and the EU 2024 list both include antimony; the critical minerals hub explains what those lists are and how they differ, and the glossary entry defines the term.

In August 2024 China announced export licensing for antimony items, and in December 2024 it announced that exports of antimony to the United States would in principle not be permitted. In November 2025 it suspended that second measure, and the suspension runs to 27 November 2026 unless extended. The other controls, including licensing and the prohibition on dual-use exports to US military users, were not part of the suspension. As of 6 October 2026 this page has found no announcement extending or ending the suspension, and it makes no prediction about what happens next. USGS reports that the United States met most of its apparent consumption from imports, that one Montana company makes primary metal and oxide from imported feedstock, and that new US mines started or began construction in 2025.

Physical logistics are not the constraint. Antimony moves in bags and drums in modest tonnages, and shipping is cheap relative to its value. USGS describes recycling (antimonial lead from spent batteries) and substitution (in battery alloys and flame retardants) as the other levers.