Which narrow passages do the world's commodities depend on?
This page lists 13 places where a large part of a commodity's trade passes through one strait, canal, river stretch or port group, from the Strait of Hormuz to the lower Mississippi. Each carries the volume as its source states it, the year it covers, the routes around it where a source names them, and the disruptions a source dates. 121 figures and 34 dated events are listed, retrieved Sat Oct 10 2026 17:00:00 GMT-0700 (Pacific Daylight Time).
The units are the sources' own: oil is in million barrels per day and LNG in billion cubic feet per day, as the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports them. The page does not convert between scopes or compute shares of its own, and a figure for one year is never set beside a figure for another. Where two sources give different numbers for the same thing, both are shown under where the sources disagree. Each figure is marked as coming from an official source (a government agency, statistical office, canal or port authority) or from trade press.
Marker positions are the coordinates the register records for each place; the smaller dots are secondary points on the same route. Several markers sit close together in the Middle East and Europe.
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') About 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption and about one-quarter of global maritime traded oil (EIA, 1H25). First half of 2025 average. 89% of crude and condensate went to Asia; China, India, Japan and South Korea together took 74% (EIA, 1H25).
20.9 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 14.7; petroleum products 6.1
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') Last full quarter before the 2026 closure. EIA warns Hormuz AIS data has been especially unreliable since late February 2026 and 2026 volumes are revised often.
21.6 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 15.9; petroleum products 5.7
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') Quarter in which military action began (Feb 28, 2026). Subject to revision (EIA).
14.9 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 10.9; petroleum products 4
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') Subject to revision (EIA). Breakdown components as printed by EIA; they sum to 4.8 because of rounding.
4.9 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 3.7; petroleum products 1.1
Natural gas: LNG, mainly from Qatar Over 20% of global LNG trade (EIA, 1H25). Almost one-third of LNG volumes destined for China in 1H25 passed through Hormuz (EIA).
Share of US crude oil and condensate imports coming from the Persian Gulf through the strait About 0.4 mb/d of crude and condensate; about 2% of US petroleum liquids consumption.
Intra-Saudi volumes (Persian Gulf ports to Saudi Red Sea ports) transiting the strait About 0.3 million b/d in 2023; EIA ties the fall to Red Sea attacks that began at the end of 2023.
Qatar's LNG exports through the strait as a share of global LNG supplies EIA wording: Qatar exported nearly 20% of global LNG supplies through the strait in 2025.
Estimated crude oil production shut-ins, seven Gulf producers named in EIA's Table 1 (Kuwait, UAE, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia), average March to July 2026 Table 1 prints 8,512 thousand b/d for the March to July 2026 average. This replaces the 7.5 mb/d March-only estimate in EIA's Apr 7, 2026 press release, which covered six countries and left out Iran.
Estimated crude oil production shut-ins, seven Gulf producers named in EIA's Table 1, monthly average at the peak EIA text gives the May peak; Table 1 prints no May column. The same text gives 5.8 mb/d in August 2026 and 4.8 mb/d in September 2026, which match Table 1's totals (5,760 and 4,770 thousand b/d). EIA estimates; Hormuz closure-related.
Saudi Aramco East-West crude pipeline plus UAE Abu Dhabi pipeline EIA text: could provide about 4.7 mb/d of capacity to bypass the strait. See conflicts_between_sources: hormuz-bypass-capacity.
The figures below are actual flows, estimated exports or shares. They are not capacity ratings.
Actual flows, estimated exports or shares on routes around Strait of Hormuz; not capacity
Route
Estimated exports, flow or share
Period
Source
Saudi East-West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea: estimated actual exports, before the September 2026 attacks (not a capacity rating) EIA wording: before the attacks, EIA estimated this pipeline was shipping more than 5.0 million b/d of oil exports via Yanbu. An export estimate, not a capacity; see conflicts_between_sources: hormuz-bypass-capacity.
5 million barrels per day (EIA: 'more than 5.0'; estimated exports via Yanbu)
2026-03-02. QatarEnergy said it had ceased production of LNG and associated products after military attacks on its operating facilities at Ras Laffan and Mesaieed (statement reported by MEED, which says the company did not name an attacker). No later QatarEnergy production statement was opened for this register. (MEED, Mar 2, 2026; trade press or news agency)
2026-03-18. An attack on the Ras Laffan LNG export facility in Qatar damaged two liquefaction trains, 17% of Qatari export capacity. As of March 19, 2026 QatarEnergy estimated repairs on those trains would take up to five years (as reported by EIA). (US EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, April 2026; official source)
2026-06-17. The United States and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding that, per EIA, sought to resume traffic through the strait. EIA reports crude tanker movements through the strait increased after the MOU. (US EIA, Today in Energy, Jul 15, 2026; official source)
2026-07. Early July 2026: renewed military strikes and uncertainty over the agreement (EIA). EIA reports prices rose in early July 2026. (US EIA, Today in Energy, Jul 15, 2026; official source)
2026-09. Attacks on Saudi Arabia's East-West oil pipeline temporarily halted flows on the bypass; EIA says it was repaired and partially resumed flows as of September 22, 2026. EIA: Vortexa ship-tracking data show oil shipments through the strait increased slightly in September as Saudi Arabia increasingly used ship-to-ship transfers along Oman's coast; estimated shut-ins averaged 4.8 mb/d in September (seven Gulf producers, Table 1). (US EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026; official source)
2026-10-06. EIA's October 2026 STEO (released Oct 6) refers to Hormuz closure-related disruptions and assumes Middle East oil flows remain constrained through the fourth quarter of 2026, with convoys through the strait and workarounds (bypass routes, ship-to-ship transfers) increasing production and exports from the region. An EIA assumption, stated as such; this register adopts no forecast. (US EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026; official source)
2026-10-06. Reuters, citing Kpler, reported 7 commodity vessels passing through the strait on October 6, 2026, the lowest figure since July 23 (Kpler excludes ships with transponders switched off); LSEG counted 8 vessels of all types. Reuters gave about 125 large commercial vessels a day before the war began on February 28. The categories differ (commodity vessels versus large commercial vessels of all kinds), so the two counts are not a like-for-like comparison. (The National, Oct 8, 2026, carrying a Reuters report citing Kpler and LSEG; trade press or news agency)
2. Strait of Malacca (with the Singapore Strait)
Links the Indian and Pacific Oceans; the shortest sea route between Middle East suppliers and East and Southeast Asian markets (EIA).
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through Strait of Malacca (with the Singapore Strait), each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') Annual average. EIA ties the 2024 dip to OPEC+ crude production cuts.
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') Equivalent to 29% of total maritime oil flows; the largest chokepoint in the world by oil volume (EIA, 1H25). China accounted for 48% of the import volumes passing through the strait in 1H25; Persian Gulf OPEC producers (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Iraq) shipped nearly 60% of crude; Russia 2%.
23.2 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 16.6; petroleum products 6.5
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') EIA's Malacca table prints 24.0 in the total row; its components (18.0 + 6.9) and its summary table give 24.9.
24.9 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 18; petroleum products 6.9
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') 1Q26 was 21.3 mb/d. EIA does not state a cause on the page opened. Subject to revision.
16.6 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 11.4; petroleum products 5.2
Other sourced figures for Strait of Malacca (with the Singapore Strait)
Figure
Value
Period
Source
Width of the strait at its narrowest point (Phillips Channel of the Singapore Strait) A 2017 EIA measurement statement. English Wikipedia gives conflicting widths and was not used.
US crude oil and condensate sent from the Atlantic coast through Malacca to East Asia The US Pacific coast received 200,000 b/d via Malacca, mainly from the Middle East.
Routes around Strait of Malacca (with the Singapore Strait), with capacity
Route
Capacity
Period
Source
Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait (Indonesian archipelago), or a longer route around the entire archipelago EIA names the alternatives; no capacity figure given.
2023 onward. Piracy and armed robbery attacks on ships increased after 2023, especially around Singapore (EIA citing the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre). No flow effect stated by EIA. (US EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (updated Mar 3, 2026); official source)
3. Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline
Egypt; connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean. The SUMED pipeline runs between Ain Sukhna and Sidi Kerir (EIA).
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline, each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products via canal and SUMED pipeline (EIA 'total oil') Pre-diversion year.
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products via canal and SUMED pipeline (EIA 'total oil') Suez/SUMED and Bab el-Mandeb together: about 6% of total seaborne-traded oil in 1H25 (EIA). Both volumes were approximately half of 2023 flows. Russia moved more crude and condensate through the canal and Bab el-Mandeb than any other country in 1H25 (EIA).
4.9 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 2.8; petroleum products 2.1
Canal revenue, calendar 2023 2024: $4 billion (down 60.7%) per the same article. A Dec 11, 2025 Xinhua item via Hellenic Shipping News quotes the SCA chairman giving $3.9 billion for 2024. No later Suez Canal Authority figure was opened for this register; shares of Suez and Bab el-Mandeb flows must not be added together.
2023-11. Houthi militia attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea began; some vessels took longer routes around the Cape of Good Hope, avoiding both Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal (EIA). EIA total oil through Suez/SUMED fell from 8.8 mb/d (2023) to 4.8 mb/d (2024); LNG through the canal fell from 4.1 to 0.5 Bcf/d. (US EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (updated Mar 3, 2026); official source)
2023-12 to 2024-12. Canal transits and revenue roughly halved: about 26,400 vessels in 2023 vs about 13,200 in 2024; revenue $10.2 billion vs $4 billion. As stated by the Suez Canal Authority via Ahram Online. (Hellenic Shipping News, Jan 23, 2025, relaying Ahram Online / SCA; trade press or news agency)
4. Bab el-Mandeb Strait
Between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East; connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea (EIA).
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through Bab el-Mandeb Strait, each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') 12% of seaborne oil trade and 8% of LNG trade in 1H23 (EIA, Feb 1, 2024). The 12% and 8% shares are for 1H23 and come from the Feb 2024 article, not the 2023 annual figure.
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') Suez/SUMED and Bab el-Mandeb together: about 6% of total seaborne-traded oil in 1H25 (EIA). Approximately half of 2023 flows (EIA).
4.2 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 2.4; petroleum products 1.8
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') Crude and condensate rose from 3.2 mb/d in 4Q25 to 6.1 in 2Q26. EIA gives no cause for the rise on the page opened. Subject to revision.
8.1 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 6.1; petroleum products 2
Natural gas: LNG 0.0 in 2024 and 1H25 (ships avoided the strait because of security concerns and high insurance rates, EIA); 3.0 in 1Q26 in EIA's quarterly tables.
Natural gas: LNG (EIA quarterly tables; the page prints a dash, not a value, for 2Q25, 3Q25 and 2Q26) LNG was 0.0 in 2024 and 1H25 in EIA's annual table; the quarterly page shows 0.3 in 1Q25 and 3.0 in 1Q26. EIA gives no cause on the page opened.
Crude oil flows through Bab el-Mandeb in December 2023 vs the January to November 2023 average Clean product flows were 30% lower in December than in the rest of 2023 (same article).
Decline in Saudi crude oil and condensate volumes via Bab el-Mandeb, 2023 to 2024 Saudi volumes through Suez/SUMED fell only about 10% as Saudi exports shifted to the East-West pipeline and Red Sea terminals.
2023-11. Yemen-based Houthi militia attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea began (EIA). Total oil through Bab el-Mandeb fell from 9.3 mb/d (2023) to 4.1 mb/d (2024); LNG fell from 4.2 Bcf/d to 0.0. (US EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (updated Mar 3, 2026); official source)
2024-01-12. Combined Maritime Forces (a partnership of 39 nations) warned ships to avoid the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. EIA expected the advisory to reduce passages through January 2024. (US EIA, Today in Energy, Feb 1, 2024; official source)
2026-07. Reuters, dated Aug 24, 2026, reports that the Houthis declared a blockade on Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea in July 2026, and that on Aug 24 the Houthis said they attacked a vessel off Saudi Arabia's port of Yanbu. The report says there was no confirmation or comment from Saudi authorities. The same report says the UK Maritime Trade Operations agency reported a tanker hit by an unknown projectile 63 nautical miles (116.7 km) west of Yanbu, with all crew safe. These are claims and reports, not EIA flow data. (Reuters, Aug 24, 2026, as carried by Internazionale; trade press or news agency)
5. Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles)
Bosporus links the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara; Dardanelles links the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean and Mediterranean (EIA). Both in Turkiye.
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles), each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products through the Dardanelles (EIA 'total oil') EIA: an estimated 3.7 mb/d through the Turkish Straits in 1H25, equivalent to 5% of global maritime trade; about 60% crude oil. Kazakhstan is the largest exporter through the straits. 2024 was 3.6 mb/d.
3.7 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 2.2; petroleum products 1.5
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products through the Bosporus (EIA 'total oil') 2024 was 3.3 mb/d. Do not add the Bosporus and Dardanelles rows together: the same cargoes can appear in both.
3.3 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 2.1; petroleum products 1.3
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products through the Dardanelles (EIA 'total oil') 1Q26 was 3.3 mb/d; 4Q25 was 3.7. Subject to revision.
4.1 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 2.7; petroleum products 1.4
Natural gas: LNG through the Dardanelles (to the Marmara LNG terminal) Turkiye does not allow LNG cargoes through the Bosporus because of safety concerns (EIA).
2022-07-22 to 2023-07-17. UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny/Pivdennyi ports; Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul) operated until its third term expired on 17 July 2023 and was not renewed. See black-sea-grain-ports. The UN page opened gives no tonnage. (United Nations, Black Sea Grain Initiative page; official source)
6. Panama Canal
Connects the Pacific Ocean with the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic; 50 miles long; narrowest point is the Culebra Cut (EIA).
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through Panama Canal, each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
Crude oil: Petroleum and other liquids, mostly refined products, through the canal (EIA 'total oil') Drought year. FY2023 was 2.2 mb/d.
Crude oil: Petroleum and other liquids, mostly refined products, through the canal (EIA 'total oil') About 3% of total global maritime petroleum and petroleum product flows (EIA, FY2025). Fiscal year, not calendar. Products ride on smaller vessels able to use the canal. See conflicts_between_sources: panama-oil-flows.
2.3 million barrels per day refined products 2.2; crude oil 0.1
Crude oil: Petroleum and other liquids, mostly refined products, through the canal (EIA 'total oil', calendar quarter, EIA estimates based on Vortexa) Different data source and calendar from the FY2025 row; do not compare.
3.2 million barrels per day petroleum products 3; crude oil and condensate 0.2
Natural gas: LNG, mainly from the US Gulf Coast to western South America and Asia Down from about 2.5 Bcf/d in FY2021; EIA ties the fall to declining water levels and rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope.
Straits of Magellan, Cape Horn and Drake Passage at the southern tip of South America EIA: these routes add up to 8,000 miles of travel or involve dangerous waterways; 8,000 mi x 1.609344 = 12,875 km (computed). EIA also names routing east via Suez or the Cape of Good Hope.
2023-07-30. Daily transits capped at 32 because of low Gatun Lake water; cut to 24 per day from November 7, 2023, against a typical 36 (EIA, citing the Panama Canal Authority). In August 2023 more than 160 vessels waited to transit; Neopanamax ships waited at least 17 days. VLGC freight Houston to Chiba reached $250 per ton in the week ending Sep 29, 2023, the highest since publication began in 2016; some VLGCs returned via Suez or the Cape. (US EIA, Today in Energy, Oct 31, 2023; official source)
2024-06-27. EIA reports the Panama Canal Authority will raise booking slots to 35 per day in August 2024 (10 Neopanamax, 25 Panamax), as rainfall improved. EIA says oil product flows recovered in FY2025 after water levels returned to average (Mar 2026 edition). (US EIA, Today in Energy, Jun 27, 2024; official source)
2026-09-03. The Maritime Executive reported on Aug 20, 2026 that the Panama Canal Authority planned to cut daily transits from 34 to 32 in a first step effective September 3, with a second cut in mid-September removing two more daily transits in the Panamax locks. The article cites worsening drought and describes the measures as temporary modifications to lock transit capacity. The article's Neopanamax and Panamax slot counts are ambiguous and are not repeated here; they would need checking against the Authority's own notice. Whether the second cut took effect was not checked. (The Maritime Executive, Aug 20, 2026; trade press or news agency)
2026-10-01. EIA cites 'ongoing drought conditions at the Panama Canal' linked to El Nino as reducing US propane exports; low water levels limit the number of ships that can transit each day and make using the canal more expensive. EIA gives no transit counts in the article. (US EIA, Today in Energy, Oct 1, 2026; official source)
7. Danish Straits
A series of channels connecting the Baltic Sea to the North Sea (EIA).
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through Danish Straits, each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products (EIA 'total oil') Equivalent to 6% of global maritime trade (EIA, 1H25); almost 60% higher than in 2021 (EIA). 2021 was 3.1 mb/d; 2023 was 5.0. Russia remained the largest exporter in 1H25 but shipped mostly from the Baltic to Asia and Turkiye rather than to western Europe and the US.
4.9 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 2.7; petroleum products 2.2
Oil flows through the Kiel Canal (alternative route; small tankers, virtually only oil products) Kiel Canal flows are not included in the Danish Straits figure.
0.2 million barrels per day (EIA: 'nearly 200,000 b/d')
2022. After the start of the war in Ukraine and EU sanctions on Russian oil exports, Russian flows through the straits shifted from western Europe toward Asia and Turkiye (EIA). Total oil through the straits rose from 3.1 mb/d (2021) to 5.0 mb/d (2023) in EIA's table. (US EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (updated Mar 3, 2026); official source)
8. Cape of Good Hope (bypass route)
Not a chokepoint; a major trade route and the alternative to Bab el-Mandeb, Suez and (in part) Panama (EIA).
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through Cape of Good Hope (bypass route), each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products around the cape, both directions (EIA 'total oil') 2023 was 6.2 mb/d; 2024 was 9.3 mb/d (EIA Table 8).
Crude oil: Crude oil, condensate and petroleum products around the cape, both directions (EIA 'total oil') About 11% of all seaborne-traded oil in 1H25; up 3 mb/d from 2022 (EIA). 5.2 mb/d of crude moved eastbound to Asia; more than 40% of crude imports traversing the cape went to China. Origins: US 23%, West Africa 28%, South America and Mexico 29%. 2024 was 9.3 mb/d.
9.1 million barrels per day crude oil and condensate 6.1; petroleum products 2.9
Natural gas: LNG around the cape The high in EIA's 2020 to 1H25 series; 5.7 Bcf/d in 1H25 as US-China trade tensions and a mild Asian winter cut imports.
2023 to 2024. Panama Canal drought and restrictions (2023) and Bab el-Mandeb/Red Sea disruptions from November 2023 pushed many oil and LNG vessels onto the cape route (EIA). EIA: the Panama disruption resolved in 2024, while Suez and Bab el-Mandeb disruptions kept flows around the cape above historical averages. (US EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (updated Mar 3, 2026); official source)
9. Black Sea grain ports (Odesa group; Novorossiysk)
Ukraine's Odesa cluster of deep-water ports (Chornomorsk, Odesa, Pivdennyi) and Russia's Novorossiysk terminals; the grain leaves through the Turkish Straits.
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through Black Sea grain ports (Odesa group; Novorossiysk), each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
Wheat: Ukrainian wheat exports, all modes (Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine data as reported by USDA AMS) 2024: 19.9 mmt (down 32.9% in 2025, as USDA states). In 2025 Ukraine was the world's fifth-largest wheat exporter (USDA). All modes, not only the ports.
Wheat, corn and soybeans (Ukraine), share leaving through ports: Share of Ukrainian corn, wheat and soybean exports moving through ports (Black Sea ports and Danube river ports; all modes = 100%) 91% in 2024 (USDA AMS). Figure shows 94.9% in 2025 and 91.4% in 2024. Rail through western border crossings was about 5% (1.6 mmt) and trucks under 1% (about 0.2 mmt) in 2025.
Grains and oilseeds (Ukraine), Odesa ports' share of sea exports: Share of Ukraine's sea exports of grains and oilseeds handled by the Odesa cluster (Chornomorsk, Odesa, Pivdennyi) 87% in 2024; the Danube ports (Izmail, Reni, Ust-Dunaysk) handled 13% in 2024 and 4% in 2025 (USDA AMS).
Grain (Russia; crop mix not stated in the source): Grain exported by the Novorossiysk Bakery Products Plant (NKHP) terminal Same Platts report: Novorossiysk Grain Terminal (NZT, Demetra Holding) has export capacity of 8.5 million mt per year. Reuters (Sep 25, 2026) gives NKHP's annual capacity as 7.1 million metric tons. KSK capacity figures differ between sources and none is used.
The figures below are actual flows, estimated exports or shares. They are not capacity ratings.
Actual flows, estimated exports or shares on routes around Black Sea grain ports (Odesa group; Novorossiysk); not capacity
Route
Flow or share
Period
Source
Rail to Danube ports via Moldova, trucking to Danube ports, rail and trucks across western EU borders An actual volume of wheat, corn and soybeans, not a capacity. Down from 3.7 mmt in 2024 (2023 to 2024 values are estimates per USDA); Danube trucking was costlier than Odesa. Dnipro and Southern Bug barge routes: zero since 2022.
1.6 million metric tons by rail through western border crossings (actual, 2025)
2022-04 (second quarter). The Port of Mykolaiv has been closed to navigation since the second quarter of 2022 (USDA AMS). USDA replaced Mykolaiv-based routes with Izmail and Constanta routes in its cost analysis. (USDA AMS, Ukraine Grain Transportation (published July 2026); official source)
2022-07-22 to 2023-07-17. UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative: signed 22 July 2022 (per the UN), not renewed after its third term expired on 17 July 2023. For context, USDA's series of the share of Ukraine's wheat, corn and soybean exports leaving through ports: 69.3% (March to December 2022), 80.1% (2023), 91.4% (2024), 94.9% (2025). USDA does not attribute these shares to the initiative. (United Nations, Black Sea Grain Initiative page (dates); USDA AMS Ukraine Grain Transportation, Jul 2026, Figure 1b (shares); official source)
2026-07-30. The Taman grain terminal ZTKT (annual capacity 5.5 million tons) was hit on July 30, 2026 and could not load grain; Reuters says it was unclear when operations could resume. Reuters' analysis of industry data: three of nine major Russian Black Sea and Azov terminals suffered serious damage, affecting about one-fifth of grain-loading capacity (four anonymous sources familiar with terminal operations). (Reuters, Sep 25, 2026, as carried by The Star (Malaysia); trade press or news agency)
2026-08-12. After an overnight attack on Novorossiysk grain terminals on August 12, 2026, the Novorossiysk Bakery Products Plant (NKHP) and the Novorossiysk Grain Terminal (NZT) suspended operations; Platts reported on Aug 15 that KSK continued to operate, but only slowly. See the Aug 13 and Sep 25 entries for later reports. Platts' report also carried unnamed Russian sellers' estimates, which are not repeated here. (Hellenic Shipping News, Aug 15, 2026, relaying Platts (S&P Global); trade press or news agency)
2026-08-13. Fastmarkets reported on Aug 19, 2026 that the KSK terminal halted operations on August 13. SovEcon, as reported by Fastmarkets: as of August 13, more than 95% of Russia's grain export capacity in the Azov-Black Sea basin was estimated to be offline. (Fastmarkets, Aug 19, 2026 (citing SovEcon); trade press or news agency)
2026-09-25. Reuters reported that NKHP (annual capacity 7.1 million metric tons) was the seriously damaged Novorossiysk terminal, with repairs taking up to six months by Reuters' account and up to four months by the company's; a source said damage at KSK and NZT was minor and both were ready to resume operations. Reuters' analysis says terminals with about 53 million tons of combined capacity were idle for security reasons but could resume, out of about 67 million tons of total regional capacity. Status after September 25 was not checked. (Reuters, Sep 25, 2026, as carried by The Star (Malaysia); trade press or news agency)
10. Lower Mississippi River (Memphis to the New Orleans port region)
Barge route to the Gulf ports for US grain bound for export; barges moved 44% of all US grain exports in 2022 (USDA AMS, nationwide).
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through Lower Mississippi River (Memphis to the New Orleans port region), each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
All grains, US exports by barge, 2022 share: Share of US grain exports moved by barge (railroads moved 45%) Same series: 46% in 2020 (earlier edition, listed below). National barge share of US grain destined for export; the brochure does not split it by river.
Corn: Share of US corn exports moved by barge, 1984-2022 update National barge share of US grain destined for export; the brochure does not split it by river. Railroads moved 44% of corn.
Corn: History, earlier edition: share of US corn exports moved by barge (final movement to export ports; includes the Columbia-Snake system) 5-year average 51% (USDA AMS, Table 3; the report does not print the years). Scope: barge to Atlantic, Pacific, Central/East/West Gulf receiving ranges; not only the Mississippi.
All grains (corn, wheat, soybeans, sorghum, barley), US exports by barge: History, earlier edition: tonnage of US grain exports moved by barge (same scope) 46% of all grain exports in 2020 (USDA AMS). Barge export tonnage, 2020, all five grains. Scope includes Columbia-Snake River barge movements.
75,141 thousand tons (as printed; the report does not say short or metric)
Corn, wheat and soybeans (US), downbound barge tonnage: Corn, wheat and soybeans carried downbound through Mississippi Locks 27, Ohio Locks and Dam 52 and Arkansas Lock and Dam 1 Calendar 2024.
26.8 million metric tons (source: 29.6 million short tons)
Grain inspected for export, Mississippi Gulf region (share of total): Share of grain inspected and/or weighed for export that was in the Mississippi Gulf region Mississippi Gulf, Texas Gulf and East Gulf together: 51% (65.4 mmt) of 128.5 mmt inspected for export in 2024 (USDA AMS). Pacific Northwest: 28% (35.9 mmt).
Fertilizer (all types): Fertilizer moved northbound through the locks on the Mississippi River System Up 9% from 2023 (USDA). 10.7 mmt of fertilizer imported at the Ports of New Orleans in 2024.
The figures below are actual flows, estimated exports or shares. They are not capacity ratings.
Actual flows, estimated exports or shares on routes around Lower Mississippi River (Memphis to the New Orleans port region); not capacity
Route
Flow or share
Period
Source
Rail and truck to Gulf ports; rail to Pacific Northwest ports A modal share, not a capacity. Rail share of exports by commodity in 2022: corn 44%, soybeans 38%, wheat 58%.
45 percent of 2022 US grain exports moved by rail (barge: 44%)
2023-10-17. Memphis gauge low point of -11.95 ft (USDA describes 2023 as having record low water levels). Peak Memphis barge spot rate $53.03 per ton in 2023; USDA says rates were lower than 2022 because export demand was lower. (USDA AMS, A Reliable Waterway System Is Important to Agriculture (Apr 2025); official source)
2024-09 to 2024-11-03. By early September 2024 barge draft had been cut to 9 ft 6 in., reducing barge capacity by 20 to 27%, and tow size to 25 barges (a 17 to 38% reduction). Memphis gauge low of -10.44 ft on Nov 3, 2024. Peak Memphis barge spot rate $25.68 per ton on Sep 17, 2024. USDA says fall 2024 hurricane rainfall helped ease low water. (USDA AMS, A Reliable Waterway System Is Important to Agriculture (Apr 2025); official source)
11. Rhine low-water bottleneck (Kaub and the Middle Rhine)
German inland waterway carrying most of Germany's inland freight; the Kaub gauge is treated by the German statistics office as an important indicator of navigable depth. Relevance to the site: coal and mineral oil products are the product groups Destatis names.
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through Rhine low-water bottleneck (Kaub and the Middle Rhine), each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
All goods (coal and mineral oil products named as the most important groups; no tonnages for them): Goods carried on German inland waterways wholly or partly on the Rhine 86.3% of the 82.4 million tonnes carried on German inland waterways in the period (Destatis). Middle Rhine Valley bottleneck: over 18,000 freight vessels carrying about 20.6 million tonnes passed in the same period.
No alternative-route capacity found in the sources opened.
What has disrupted it, and when?
2022-07 to 2022-08. Summer 2022 low water on the Rhine. Goods transported on the Upper Rhine fell 49% in July and 77% in August 2022 against the same months of 2021; waterside cargo in the main Upper Rhine ports fell 41% in August 2022 vs August 2021. CCNR says low water and, to a lesser extent, the war in Ukraine were the two decisive factors; dry bulk freight rates showed the strongest rise of all segments in 2022 (reasons given: low water, capacity bottlenecks, high coal transport demand). (CCNR, low water experts' workshop, Jan 18, 2023; official source)
2026-08-13. Record low reported by Argus: the Kaub gauge stood at 11 cm on August 13, 2026, with the German Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration expecting 6 cm by the weekend, which Argus called 'another all-time low'; barge operators said most traffic was halted south of Mainz. A gauge value in centimeters, not water depth. (Argus Media, Aug 13, 2026; trade press or news agency)
2026-09-25. The Kaub water-level gauge (raw data, 15-minute readings, unit cm) read between -1 and -6 cm on several days from September 25 to October 8, 2026: -6 cm at 02:45 local time on October 1 was the lowest reading in the 30 days to October 11, and readings were 16 cm at 11:15 on October 11. A gauge value, not water depth: the gauge zero is 67.669 m above the NHN datum (PEGELONLINE). PEGELONLINE's published lowest daily water level for November 2010 to October 2020 is 25 cm (October 22, 2018). The 30-day window fetched starts on September 11, 2026 (22 cm). (WSV PEGELONLINE (German Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration), station KAUB, parameter W, retrieved Oct 11, 2026; official source)
12. DR Congo copper outlets (Lobito corridor, Dar es Salaam, Durban)
Three export outlets for Copperbelt metal and concentrate: Lobito (Atlantic, via the Lobito Atlantic Railway), Dar es Salaam (Indian Ocean) and Durban (Indian Ocean). No source found that splits DR Congo copper exports by outlet in tonnes; the volumes below are production context and all-cargo throughput, not copper flows.
What passes through, and in which year?
Volumes through DR Congo copper outlets (Lobito corridor, Dar es Salaam, Durban), each for its own year and scope
Commodity and scope
Volume
Period
Source
Copper: DR Congo (Congo, Kinshasa) copper mine production (context, not an export or route volume) 2025 estimate: 3,200 thousand tons; world total 23,000 in both years (USGS). Local copy: data/raw/usgs_chapters/mcs2026-copper.pdf.
All cargo (not copper-specific): Cargo carried by the Lobito Atlantic Railway to and from the Port of Lobito Record month 37,000 t in December 2025 (domestic and international traffic); about 30,000 t in January 2026 (same article). All cargo, not copper-specific.
All cargo (not copper-specific): DRC-bound transit cargo through the Port of Dar es Salaam (all cargo, not copper) 53% of transit cargo (14.61 million tonnes) at the port (as reported by The Citizen). All cargo, not copper: the article does not mention copper. FY2024/25: 5.99 million tonnes (+30% to FY2025/26).
Other sourced figures for DR Congo copper outlets (Lobito corridor, Dar es Salaam, Durban)
Figure
Value
Period
Source
Lobito main line length (Lobito to Negrao and the Luau border) 30-year concession signed Nov 4, 2022; connects to the Congolese rail network to Kolwezi.
Routes around DR Congo copper outlets (Lobito corridor, Dar es Salaam, Durban), with capacity
Route
Capacity
Period
Source
Alternative DRC copper outlets: Dar es Salaam, Durban (and others not sourced here) No route-level copper capacity or volume found in sources that could be opened.
Bauxite: Guinea to China exports, HS 260600 (aluminium ores and concentrates, mostly bauxite) BACI reconciles mirror statistics; it is not Guinean or Chinese customs data directly. Quantities in metric tons; Guinea's 69.0% share of China's HS 260600 imports is by weight (110,091,480 t of 159,595,439 t), not by value, so it will differ from a value-based share.
No alternative route; substitute supply is other mines. USGS gives production only, no spare-capacity data.
What has disrupted it, and when?
2025-08. The Guinean Government, following a dispute over construction of an alumina refinery, revoked bauxite mining licenses from a subsidiary of a United Arab Emirates-based aluminum producer and reallocated the concessions to a state-backed mining company (USGS). USGS gives no flow effect. (USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, Bauxite and Alumina (Events, Trends, and Issues); official source)
Where do the sources disagree?
These are places where two sources, or two editions of one source, give figures that do not match. Where a footnote says which figure the register publishes, it is because EIA's own components or summary table support it; otherwise the page shows both and does not pick one.
Strait of Hormuz bypass: EIA (Mar 2026) gives about 4.7 mb/d of combined bypass capacity (Saudi East-West + UAE Abu Dhabi pipelines). EIA's October 2026 STEO estimates the East-West pipeline alone was shipping more than 5.0 mb/d of exports via Yanbu before the September 2026 attacks. One is a capacity figure for two pipelines; the other is an estimated actual export volume on one pipeline, so the register prints the second as estimated exports, not as capacity. EIA Today in Energy, Nov 21, 2023, gave 5 mb/d East-West capacity and 1.5 mb/d for the Fujairah pipeline, with about 3.5 mb/d unused. EIA does not reconcile these figures in the pages opened.
Strait of Malacca, 4Q25 (footnote): EIA's Malacca table prints 24.0 mb/d in its total row, but its components (18.0 crude oil and condensate + 6.9 petroleum products) and its summary table give 24.9. The register publishes 24.9. EIA does not explain the 24.0.
EIA Mar 2026 table: Panama Canal oil 2.3 mb/d in FY2025 (Panama Canal Authority data, fiscal year). EIA STEO quarterly page: 2.8, 2.5, 2.8, 2.8 mb/d for 1Q25 to 4Q25 (EIA estimates based on Vortexa data, calendar quarters). Different data sources and calendars; do not compare.
Novorossiysk KSK terminal after the 12 Aug 2026 attack: Platts (via Hellenic Shipping News, Aug 15) said KSK continued to operate, but only slowly; Fastmarkets (Aug 19) says KSK halted operations on Aug 13; Reuters (Sep 25) cites a source saying KSK damage was minor and it was ready to resume. The reports are dated days or weeks apart, so they may describe different moments; the register does not pick one. A KSK capacity figure of 10.85 million mt appeared in the Platts report with no scope or year stated and is not used.
What this page leaves out
It leaves out the Taiwan Strait, where no commodity volume was found in a source that could be opened, and any figure that rests on a source the register's writer could not read. Flow figures for the Strait of Hormuz since late February 2026 come from EIA, which warns that ship-tracking data there has been unreliable and that its 2026 estimates are revised often. The register is a record of what sources state, not an estimate of what is moving through each place.
More patterns
Concentration: How much of each commodity comes from one country?
Every figure is computed from the same tables as the commodity pages. The full set is in patterns.json, and single facts from it appear each day on the facts page.
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